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Abstract 
The relationship between corruption and economic growth has been the focus of 
numerous studies. However, no consensus seems to exist on the mechanisms via 
which corruption should reduce growth. The aim of this paper is to identify the 
transmission channels through which corruption is likely to affect economic growth. 
Unlike most previous analysis in this area that used the decomposition method [Mo 
(2001), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) and, Pellegrini (2011)], we employ a Channel 
Methodology [developed by Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) and applied by Wacziarg 
(2001) and, more recently, by Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg (2008)]. This 
methodology based on a system of simultaneous equations to evaluate the effects of 
corruption on various determinants of economic growth, will allow us to show how 
corruption affects growth via each possible channel. Our results suggest that the 
negative effect of corruption on economic growth is mainly transmitted by its impact 
on human capital and political instability.    
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1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of corruption has long been a major concern. Among the various 
forms of this phenomenon, economists often retain those related to public decisions1 
and, adopt a definition similar to that used by the World Bank for which corruption 
can be understood as the abuse of public office for private gain2. The growing attention 
paid to this phenomenon since the middle of the nineties has accompanied the need to 
assess its various economic costs, particularly in terms of economic growth. 
Empirically, although many researchers have found that there is a significant negative 
relationship between corruption and growth rates, others contest this result and show 
that the impact of corruption on growth becomes statistically non significant once 
some of the usual determinants of economic growth are controlled for. These mixed 
results seem to favor the idea that the direct effect of corruption on growth is relatively 
low and that some explanatory variables included in the used empirical models are 
acting as transmission channels3. In other words, this suggests that if corruption is 
likely to affect economic growth, its effect will be transmitted indirectly via its impacts 
on the standard determinants of economic growth. This fact was reinforced by a 
number of authors who explicitly argued that the total effect of corruption on 
economic growth can be decomposed into a direct impact and a set of indirect effects 
manifested by a number of transmission variables [Mo (2001), Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
(2004), Dreher and Herzfeld (2005), and Pellegrini (2011)]. Such findings represented 
in reality a significant advance toward a better understanding of the various 
consequences of corruption which may allow, as denoted by Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
(2004), to limit some of its negative effects on the economy. In this paper, we revisit 
the relationship between corruption and economic growth. Our main interest is to 
specify the mechanisms via which corruption should affect growth. The remainder of 
the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides theoretical underpinnings and 
surveys the related literature on the linkage between corruption and economic growth. 
Section 3 describes our data and empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the 
                                                          
1
 For details on private corruption, see Argandoña, A. (2003).   
2
 World Bank (1997), Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, p. 8.  The World 
Bank: Washington DC.  
3
This idea has already been reported since the pioneering study by Mauro (1995) for which the effect of 
corruption on economic growth tends to disappear once the variable measuring the ratio of investment in 
GDP is included as an explanatory variable. Mauro (1995) asserts that the impact of corruption on growth 
is largely due to its effect on investment.  
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empirical results on the channel effects. Section 5 discusses the robustness of our 
results, and finally, section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Corruption and economic growth: Theoretical underpinnings and survey of 
related literature 
The phenomenon of corruption has been the subject of observation and study for 
long time and still receives much attention. Although it is widely accepted that 
corruption is a detrimental phenomenon, the existing literature often shows mixed 
evidence about its effect on economic growth. The aim of this section is to present a 
general review of the theoretical and empirical contributions related to the 
consequences of corruption. Firstly, we recall the main theoretical arguments often 
used to apprehend the effects of corruption on the economy. Secondly, we provide a 
brief survey of the empirical literature on the relationship between corruption and 
economic growth. Thirdly, we review existing studies dealing with the transmission 
channels through which corruption is likely to influence growth.   
2.1. Theoretical arguments on the economic effects of corruption 
The theoretical underpinnings lying behind the relation between corruption and 
economic performance are diverse. Reflections have always been divided between 
those who saw that corruption could accelerate economic growth and those who, 
instead, focus on highlighting the prejudicial effects of this phenomenon. The most 
obvious argument always used in favour of a possible beneficial effect of corruption is 
its capacity to avoid administrative rigidities and to grease the wheels of bureaucracy 
(Leff, 1964). This suggests that corruption can be a source of efficiency for removing 
rigidities imposed by the state which impede investment and disrupt other economic 
decisions favorable to growth. In this sense, Lui (1985) proposes a queue model and 
points out that corruption may be desirable because it minimizes the average value of 
time costs of the queue, and can drive corrupt officials to be more efficient and to 
make decisions faster. Other contributions stipulate that in the bidding process, 
payment of bribes can be a guarantee of efficiency that the contracts will be awarded 
to the most efficient firms, those who, through their resources, can offer the highest 
grafts [Beck and Maher (1986), and Lien (1986)].    
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However, the view of an efficient corruption is not uncontested. Many writers have 
argued that this view of corruption is based on a problematic assumption that 
considers regulations and administrative procedures as exogenous and unrelated to 
corruption. Indeed, it is not unrealistic to suppose that public officials may create 
delays or administrative rigidities for the sole purpose of collecting bribes. For 
instance, Myrdal (1968) argues that if corruption is allowed to accelerate procedures, 
public officials will then have an interest in creating more rigidities and in maintaining 
slow administrative procedures to obtain more payments. Kaufmann and Wei (2000) 
indicate that regulatory burden and delays are endogenously chosen by the 
bureaucrats in order to extract rents and, that firms which pay the highest amounts of 
bribes are those that spend more, not less, time in negotiating regulations with 
bureaucrats and therefore they face a higher, not lower, cost of capital. Tanzi (1998) 
denotes also that firms which can afford to offer the highest bribe are not necessarily 
the most economically efficient. Moreover, the existence of such payments may divert 
firms and talented individuals from productive activities to rent-seeking activities 
resulting in a suboptimal use of human capital, which in turn could damage economic 
growth (Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, 1991). Corruption tends also to reduce 
investment incentives for both local and foreign entrepreneurs. When the latter are 
often forced to pay bribes before creating their business or when they are often 
solicited to pay large sums of money to public officials to remain in business, 
corruption hinders or even blocks the creation and development of enterprises and 
hence, disadvantages economic growth. In addition, corruption increases transaction 
costs, impedes the development of a market economy, undermines the system of free 
markets by increasing the degree of uncertainty and reduces the state revenues while 
raising its spending [Rose-Ackerman (1997) and Tanzi (1998)]. In particular, it 
compromises the fundamental role of the state in some areas such as contracts 
enforcement and protection of property rights, and makes it difficult for government 
intervention to impose necessary regulatory controls and inspections to correct for 
market failures. Corruption leads also to a misallocation of resources, particularly 
when the investment of public funds and approval of private investments are decided, 
not on the basis of economic or social value of projects, but rather on the potential 
revenue that public officials expect to receive from their decisions (Jain, 2001). This 
suggests that the structure of public spending is often altered in favor of certain 
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sectors, particularly those where opportunities for corruption are more obvious [Tanzi 
and Davoodi (1997), Mauro (1998) and De la Croix and Delavallade (2007, 2009)]. 
Other arguments for which corruption should be considered harmful to growth are 
mentioned by Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002) who argued that corruption 
can result in more income inequality and higher poverty because it affects the 
targeting of social programs to the truly need and enables wealthiest individuals to 
take advantage of government-funded programs at the cost of the rest of the 
population. Summing up the theoretical literature on the economic effects of 
corruption, it appears that the predominant view of corruption is that it is a major 
impediment to economic performance. This view seems to be largely confirmed by the 
empirical literature related to the consequences of this phenomenon. The next 
subsection briefly reviews the existing literature on the relationship between 
corruption and economic growth.    
2.1. Corruption and economic growth: review of empirical literature 
The empirical literature on the effect of corruption on economic growth has 
experienced an unprecedented expansion since the middle of the nineties which is 
mainly due to the availability of new and more reliable data on corruption. The 
majority of previous studies found that corruption might have negative growth effects. 
For instance, Mauro (1995) shows that corruption is negatively and significantly 
related to GDP per capita growth rate for a cross-section of 58 countries for the period 
1960-1985. In that paper, the author reports that a one standard deviation 
improvement in the corruption index is associated with a 0.8 percentage point 
increase in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. This result was later confirmed 
by several empirical studies that found evidence of a significant negative association 
between corruption and economic growth [Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1997), 
Leite and Weidmann (1999), Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), Gyimah-Brempong (2002), 
Méon and Sekkat (2005)]. However, some authors have questioned the robustness of 
the empirical relationship between corruption and economic growth, with some 
studies finding that the effect of corruption on economic growth is not always 
significant, others finding the effect quite sensitive to the inclusion of other important 
determinants of growth. For instance, Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1998) fail to 
detect any significant association between corruption and economic growth. In several 
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studies the significant relationship tends to disappear when other conditioning 
variables are included in the regression. This is well illustrated by the study developed 
by Abed and Davoodi (2000). The objective of that paper is to test the importance of 
corruption against that of structural reforms in explaining macroeconomic 
performance for the transition economies. Regression analysis performed by the 
authors for 25 transition countries over the period 1994-1998 have shown that the 
coefficient on corruption becomes statistically insignificant when the structural 
reforms index is added to the regression. A similar finding has already been stressed 
by the seminal work of Mauro (1995) who found that after controlling for investment, 
the effect of corruption on economic growth becomes insignificant. Other authors 
including Mo (2001), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) and Pellegrini (2011) have also 
provided similar evidence and reported that the relationship between corruption and 
economic growth becomes statistically insignificant after controlling for other 
important determinants of growth such as investments, human capital, openness, and 
political instability.  
In a related issue, the more recent empirical literature highlights that the effect of 
corruption on growth cannot be explained without taking into account the 
institutional framework of countries. A number of studies argued that the relationship 
between corruption and economic growth is non linear, suggesting that the impact of 
corruption on growth might vary across countries according to the quality of their 
institutional setting. For instance, Mendez and Sepulveda (2005) found evidence of a 
non-monotonic relationship between corruption and economic growth and reported 
that corruption has a beneficial impact in countries where there are high degrees of 
political freedom; elsewhere the effect of corruption on growth is not robust. Aidt, 
Dutta and Sena (2008) have explored how corruption and economic growth are linked 
and jointly determined by the quality of political institutions and found that in 
countries with high quality institutions, corruption has a large negative impact on 
growth, while in countries with low quality institutions, corruption has, in contrast, no 
impact on growth. The decisive role of institutions in determining the effects of 
corruption on economic growth was recently examined by Méon and Weill (2010). 
Theses authors provide evidence that corruption is substantially less harmful in 
countries where the institutional framework is less effective. This finding that seems in 
  
 7 
favor of an efficient corruption that helps overcoming the existing institutional 
deficiencies is also confirmed by Heckelman and Powell (2010). Precisely, they show 
that corruption is positively associated to economic growth in countries where 
economic freedom is limited, but this positive impact tends to decrease as economic 
freedom increases.  
In summary, the main conclusion that can be derived from the above studies is that 
the relation between corruption and economic growth is empirically very ambiguous. 
Some studies found a significant negative effect of corruption on growth, others that 
the effect is statistically insignificant, yet others show the effect to be heterogeneous 
across countries with different institutional frameworks. A common finding shared by 
many previous studies is that the significant association between corruption and 
economic tends to disappear when other conditioning variables are included in the 
regression [Mauro (1995), Abed and Davoodi (2000), Mo (2001), Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
(2004) and Pellegrini (2011)]. This finding suggests that large part of the effect of 
corruption on growth is transmitted indirectly through the main determinants of 
economic growth. In the next subsection, we propose to review the main results of 
studies devoted to identify the mechanisms by which corruption could effectively affect 
economic growth. 
2.3. Previous studies on the links between corruption and economic growth 
Despite an extensive existing empirical literature on the relationship between 
corruption and economic growth, very little evidence exists on the transmission 
channels of the effect of corruption on growth. This issue has been first tackled by Mo 
(2001). His objective is to estimate the effects of corruption and the channels through 
which it affects the rate of GDP growth. Using OLS regression analysis for 45 countries 
for the period 1970- 1985, he initially found a significant negative association between 
corruption and economic growth, but the magnitude of the effect decreases 
substantially and becomes statistically insignificant after controlling for other 
determinants of growth namely investment, human capital and political instability. 
This finding leads Mo (2001) to conclude that apart from its obvious direct effect, 
corruption is likely to influence the growth rate indirectly via its impacts on these 
three variables. In this sens, he suggests that the overall effect of corruption on 
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economic growth can be decomposed into a direct effect and a set of indirect effects 
following the formula below:  
 
       
           
  
       
           
       
       
   
 
   
           
  
 
  
   
where TV represents each of the three transmission variables namely investment, 
human capital and political instability.  
In order to estimate the impact of each channel in the transmission process, a 
second step was performed by the author. It consists on estimating separately the 
effect of corruption on each transmission variable. Multiplying the effects of corruption 
on the channel and the effect of the channel on growth allows the author to calculate 
the effect of corruption on growth via that specific channel. The main result of this 
decomposition method shows that a one-unit increase in the corruption index reduces 
the growth rate by 0.545 %. This overall effect is mainly due to the indirect effects of 
corruption on political instability, investment and human capital, which account for 
53%, 21.4%, and 14.8%, respectively, of the overall effect of corruption on the growth 
rate. Taken together, these three transmission channels describe 88.2 % of 
corruption’s overall effect whereas the direct effect of corruption on growth accounts 
only for 11.8 % of its overall effect.  
The same decomposition method was later applied by Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) 
who retain the same transmission channels studied by Mo (2001) and consider trade 
openness as an additional transmission variable through which corruption might 
affect economic growth. For a sample of 48 countries over the period 1975-1996, 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) found that one standard deviation decrease in the 
corruption index is associated with an increase in economic growth by 1.05% per year. 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) state that this negative effect is largely transmitted 
indirectly via the transmission channels which represent 81 % of the overall impact of 
corruption on growth. More especially, Pellegrini and Gerlagh’s (2004) results show 
that the contribution of each transmission channels to the overall effect of corruption 
on economic growth equals 32, 28, 16, and 5%, respectively for investment, trade 
openness, political instability, and human capital. In a more recent version of this 
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paper, Pellegrini (2011) provides evidence that indirect effects of corruption on 
economic growth account for 61% of its overall effect4. He also shows that the most 
important channel through which corruption hampers economic growth is by lowering 
investment, which accounts for one-third of corruption’s overall negative effects.  
In addition to the aforementioned papers, the study developed by Dreher and 
Herzfeld (2005) has also investigated how corruption affects economic growth through 
a variety of channels. Using the three-stage least squares method on 71 countries for 
the period 1975-2001, Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) estimate a system of seven 
equations which account for the impacts of corruption on economic growth as well as 
on six possible channels of influence. However, they retain as transmission channels 
of the effect of corruption on economic growth only variables whose coefficients in the 
estimated growth equation are statistically significant at least at the ten percent level. 
Doing so, they found that a one point increase in the corruption index increases GDP 
per capita growth rate by 0.129%, 0.225% et de 0.451% through the investment, 
inflation and government expenditure channels, respectively, and reduces growth by 
0.106% via the foreign aid channel. Once the direct effect of corruption on economic 
growth and all transmission channels are taken into account, Dreher and Herzfeld 
(2005) conclude that the overall effect of corruption on the growth rate of GDP per 
capita is negative and amounts to 0.13%.  
3. Empirical Methodology, Model specification and Data 
A shared characteristic to the previous studies focusing on the transmission 
channels of the effect of corruption on economic growth is that they include a limited 
number of variables that might explain the linkage between corruption and growth. 
This could lead to overestimate the relative contribution of each transmission variable 
to the overall effect of corruption on economic growth. Indeed, this would be 
particularly more problematic because the existing empirical literature explicitly 
recognizes that the most known determinants of economic growth are also 
significantly affected by corruption and, hence, could have a role in explaining the 
                                                          
4
 The study developed by Pellegrini (2011) differs from Pellegrini and Gerlagh’s (2004) paper only regarding 
the period used to calculate the growth rate  (1980-2004 instead of 1975-1996) and the instruments used 
to control for the endogeneity of corruption (the share of fuels and minerals on merchandise exports and 
the share of Protestants in the population instead of the legal origins).  
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observed overall impact of corruption on growth5. In this respect, the objective of the 
present empirical study is to analyze several interdependencies that may influence the 
relationship between corruption and growth, and therefore, to identify the channels 
through which corruption is likely to affect growth. To do so, we follow an empirical 
methodology different to that adopted by the majority of similar previous studies6. This 
methodology is based on the estimation of a system of simultaneous equations for a 
wide cross section of countries that allow us to assess the incidence of corruption on 
various determinants of growth and to highlight the relative contribution of each 
channel to the overall corruption’s growth effect. In this section, we first present the 
proposed empirical methodology and then we describe the model specification, the 
estimation method and, the data we use.  
3.1. Empirical Strategy 
In order to explicit the channels through which corruption is likely to affect growth, 
we proceed in the present empirical study, as do Dreher and Herzfeld (2005), with a 
system of simultaneous equations. Moving away from the decomposition method 
applied by most previous studies, the empirical methodology we follow will allow us to 
take into account the impact of corruption on several determinants of growth and to 
provide evidence on the relative contribution of each channel to the overall effect of 
corruption on growth. The starting point to the empirical model is a growth equation 
to which is added a set of equations describing a variety of indirect effects of 
corruption on growth and one additional equation that accounts for the determinants 
of corruption. The corruption equation is introduced into the system to deal with the 
endogeneity problem related to the simultaneous determination of corruption, 
economic growth, and the transmission variables. Although it seems impossible to 
analyze all interdependencies lying behind the relationship between corruption and 
growth, we attempt to look at the impacts of corruption on five determinants of 
economic growth at once, namely investment, human capital, government 
expenditure, inflation and political instability. These variables resume most of the 
transmission channels explored by previous empirical studies [Mo (2001), Pellegrini 
                                                          
5
 For reviews on the links between corruption and several determinants of economic growth, see for 
instance Arnone and Iliopulos (2007) and Lambsdorff, J. G. (2006, pp.22-38).  
6
 For details on the vigorous criticisms leveled at the decomposition method adopted by Mo (2001), 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), and Pellegrini (2011), see Akai, Horiuchi and Sakata (2005, 2006).   
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and Gerlagh (2004), Dreher and Herzfeld (2005), and Pellegrini (2011)]. The choice of 
these transmission variables is also consistent with the existing empirical literature 
that acknowledges their role as major determinants of economic growth while showing 
that each of which is significantly affected by corruption. Indeed, numerous studies 
have found that corruption has significant impact on investment [Mauro (1995, 1997), 
Brunetti and Weder (1998), Campos, Lien and Pradhan (1999) and, Rock and Bonnett 
(2004)], on human capital [Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), Gupta, 
Davoodi and Tiongson (2001) and, Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008)], on government 
expenditure [Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and, Haque and Kneller (2008)], on inflation 
[Al-Marhubi (2000) and de Honlonkou (2003)], and on political instability [Mo (2001) 
and, Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004)].  
The empirical methodology we follow to quantify the contribution of each of these 
five transmission variables to the effect of corruption on economic growth is close to 
the Channel Methodology developed by Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) to explore links 
between democracy and economic growth. The same methodology was later applied by 
Wacziarg (2001) to assess the transmission channels of the effect of trade openness on 
growth and, more recently, by Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg (2008) to examine 
the mechanisms through which death rates affect growth. Using a system of 
simultaneous equations, this methodology consists in excluding corruption from the 
growth regression and estimating its effects on each of the channel variables. By 
multiplying the effect of corruption on the channel and the effect of the channel on 
growth, the effect of corruption on growth through that specific channel can be 
identified.  
Doing so, this methodology will enable us to decompose the total effect of corruption 
on growth into its various channels and, on the other hand, to assess the relative 
contribution of each transmission variable to the overall effect of corruption on 
economic growth, taking into account other competing channels. In addition, it helps 
us to know whether the five channel variables under consideration fully capture the 
total effect of corruption on growth. The proposed methodology is also particularly 
valuable as it allows testing various theoretical arguments on the costs and potential 
benefits of corruption.  
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3.2. Model specification and estimation method   
The adopted econometric specification is based on a set of seven equations 
determining growth, corruption and the channel variables. The first equation is a 
growth regression where GDP per capita growth rate (GR) is related to the initial per 
capita GDP (IGDP) and the five transmission variables. For the remaining equations, 
the chosen specification is based on the existing empirical literature on the 
determinants of each endogenous variable under consideration. Following Serra (2006) 
who implemented an Extreme-Bounds Analysis to assess the robustness of various 
corruption’s determinants, we explain corruption (CRP) with five variables, namely the 
level of per capita GDP (GDP), the share of Protestants in the population (PROT), the 
degree of political instability (PI) and, two dummies accounting for British colonial 
heritage (COLUK) and for maintaining democratic institutions for a long time period 
(DLP), respectively. The human capital (HC) equation contains three explanatory 
variables (GDP), (PSE), and (URBAN) which account for per capita income, public 
spending on education and urbanization rate, respectively [Gupta, Davoodi and 
Tiongson (2001), Gupta, Verhoeven and Tiongson (2002), Al-Samarrai (2006), 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) and, Baldacci, Clements, Gupta and Cui (2008)] and 
one additional variable accounting for ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) [Tavarez 
and Wacziarg (2001), Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) and, Dearmon and Grier (2011)]. 
For the investment channel (INV), the specification draws upon Mauro (1995) who 
controls for initial per capita income (IGDP), government expenditure (GOV) and 
human capital (HC) and, following Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) and Wacziarg (2001), 
we add four variables (POP15), (POP65), (OPEN) et (ELF) controlling for the share of 
population aged under 15, the share of population aged over 65, trade openness and 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, respectively. Specification of government expenditure 
(GOV) equation includes three variables (IGDP), (POP) and (URBAN) controlling for 
initial per capita income, country population and urbanization rate, respectively 
(Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998) and variables measuring the share of population aged 
under 15 (POP15), the share of population aged over 65 (POP65) and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) [Tavarez and Wacziarg (2001), and Wacziarg (2001)]. For the 
inflation equation, the specification is based on Al-Marhubi (2000) who controls for per 
capita income (GDP) and trade openness (OPEN) for which we add two additional 
variables related to government size (GOV) and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) 
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(Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001). The specification of the political instability (PI) is close 
to that estimated by Tavarez and Wacziarg (2001) who specify this variable as a 
function of initial per capita income (IGDP), ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), 
country population (POP), government expenditure (GOV) and a landlocked country 
dummy (LANDLOCK). In sum, the baseline specification describing the behavior of the 
endogenous variables can be summarized as follow:  
Table 1. Model specification 
 
As presented in the table above, all equations are over identified and, therefore, the 
system of equations will be estimated using the three-stage least squares method 
(3SLS) which treats all equations and all parameters jointly and not equation-by-
equation. This method, developed by Zellner and Theil (1962), is considered as a full 
information method or a system estimation method that takes account of a possible 
correlation between the disturbances of the different equations. In addition, the three-
stage least squares method (3SLS) is more efficient than the two-stage least squares 
method (2SLS) if the system of equations is properly specified (Baltagi, 2008, p. 268). 
The first stage of this method provides instruments for all endogenous variables. These 
Dependent Variables GR CRP HC INV GOV INFL PI 
Equation n° [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Endogenous Variables  
Corruption (CRP)   * * * * * 
Human Capital (HC) *   *    
Investment  (INV) *        
Government Expenditure  (GOV) *   *  * * 
Inflation (INFL) *       
Political Instability (PI) * *       
Exogenous Variables         
Initial per capita income  (IGDP) *   * *  * 
Per capita income  (GDP)  * *   *  
Public spending on education (PSE)   *     
Urbanization rate  (URBAN)   *  *   
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF)   * * * * * 
Country population (POP)     *  * 
Share of population under 15 (POP15)    * *   
Share of population over 65 (POP65)     * *   
Trade openness (OPEN)    *  *  
Landlocked dummy (LANDLOCK)        * 
Share of Protestants in the population  (PROT)  *      
Uninterrupted democracy dummy  (DLP)  *      
Former British colony dummy (COLUK)  *      
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instruments are the predicted values obtained from a regression of each endogenous 
variable on all exogenous variables included in the system. The second stage estimates 
each equation in the model separately with the two-stage least squares method (2SLS) 
using instruments from the first stage. This allows retrieving a consistent variance-
covariance matrix for the error terms of the model. The third stage performs a 
generalized-least square estimation using the variance-covariance matrix estimated in 
the second stage and the instruments of the endogenous variables constructed in the 
first stage (Greene, 2003, p. 405-406). Furthermore, we use Breusch-Pagan (1980) test 
of independence to investigate whether cross-equation disturbances are indeed 
correlated and, by this way, we verify if the model requires a system estimation 
method. We also use the specification test of Hausman (1978) to ascertain whether the 
system is properly specified and whether the three-stage least squares method (3SLS) 
is more appropriate than the two-stage least squares method (2SLS)7.  
3.3. Data and preliminary analysis 
The present analysis is based on cross-country data covering a total of 82 
countries, both developed and developing, over the period 1980-2002 (table 1 in 
appendix lists the countries included in the analysis). Given the large number of 
explanatory variables used for the specification of the various equations, our data are 
drawn from a number of sources. Our first dependent variable is the growth rate as 
measured by the growth rate of real per capita GDP between 1980 and 2002, using the 
World Bank World Development Indicators database (CD-ROM edition, 2004). Almost 
all variables used in this analysis are averaged over the period under study or over the 
period for which data were available, except for initial per capita income measured in 
1980. The data on corruption come from the Political Risk Services/ International 
Country Risk Guide database, over the period 1982-2001. The International Country 
Risk Guide corruption index (ICRG) ranges from zero to six, with higher scores 
indicate lower corruption levels. For the sake of simplicity, we recode the original data 
so as to obtain a corruption index that ranges from zero (least corrupt) to six (most 
corrupt). To measure political instability (PI), we employ the political stability index 
drawn from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008) over the period 1996-2002. This 
index has been transformed on a scale that ranges between zero and five so that 
                                                          
7
 All estimations and statistical tests are carried out using STATA 10.1 software.  
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higher levels correspond to more political instability instead of less as on the original 
scale. For the remaining dependent variables, all data are taken from the World 
Bank's World Development Indicator where investment (INV) is measured by the gross 
fixed capital formation (% of GDP), human capital (HC) is proxied by the secondary 
gross enrolment rate, inflation (INFL) is approximated by the GDP deflator (annual %) 
and government expenditures (GOV) are measured by the share of general government 
final consumption expenditure in GDP (table 2 in appendix  describes all variables 
used in the analysis with their data sources). In order to offer a preliminary insight on 
the main variables under study, we present below the correlation coefficients for the 
major variables of interest, namely the growth rate, corruption and the five 
transmission variables (table 3 in appendix presents descriptive statistics for all 
variables used in the analysis). 
Correlation Matrix for Main Variables  
 GR ICRG HC INV GOV INFL PI 
ICRG -0.367*** 1      
HC 0.451*** -0.711*** 1     
INV 0.484***  -0.099 0.291*** 1    
GOV  -0.007 -0.417*** 0.412*** 0.125 1   
INFL -0.264** 0.242** -0.283** -0.235** -0.218** 1  
PI -0.415*** 0.711*** -0.637*** -0.145 -0.378*** 0.428* 1 
Notes: -  Number of observations: 82 
- ***, **,* denote correlation coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Generally, the correlation matrix among the main variables shows coefficients that 
are in line with previous theoretical and empirical work both on the determinants of 
economic growth and the consequences of corruption. As shown in the first column, 
growth is indeed positively correlated with human capital and investment while it is 
negatively associated with inflation, government expenditures and political instability. 
The second column of the matrix shows a negative correlation between corruption and 
human capital, investment and government expenditures whereas the corruption 
index is found to be positively correlated with inflation and political instability. Expect 
for investment, all correlations between corruption and the channel variables are 
relatively high and all significant at conventional levels.  
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The high correlations between corruption and the transmission variables can be 
interpreted as a confirmation of the choice we made concerning channels used to 
explain the effect of corruption on economic growth and for the adoption of a 
specification based on the estimation of a simultaneous equations system. In sum, the 
picture that emerges from the correlation matrix suggests that corruption works 
negatively on growth through its impacts on human capital, investment, inflation and 
political instability and, positively via the government expenditures channel. 
Nevertheless, this picture could differ considerably when taking into account 
interactions between the numerous variables under study and controlling for the 
determinants of each endogenous variable. 
4. Empirical evidence 
In this section, we present and discuss the mains results of our econometric 
analysis. First, we describe results on the effect of the transmission variables on 
economic growth as well as the impact of corruption on each channel variable. Then, 
we analyze the relative contribution of each channel variable to the overall effect of 
corruption on economic growth.   
4.1. Estimation results 
Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix report the estimates of the baseline model as well as the 
statistical tests we performed. Theses tables contain the estimates of the baseline 
specification using respectively the 2SLS and the 3SLS, the Breusch-Pagan test 
performed to examine whether cross-equations disturbances are correlated and, the 
Hausman test used to choose the appropriate estimation method. The result of the 
Breusch-Pagan test shows that cross-equations residuals were not independent (the 
probability of the test equals 0.07 and, hence, the test rejects the null hypothesis of 
independence) and indicates, therefore, that the equations need to be estimated 
simultaneously. We also found that the Hausman test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis, showing that the specification of the various equations is correct and the 
3SLS method is indeed consistent and efficient whereas 2SLS is only consistent.  In 
this respect, we present in the table 2 below the main results we obtained through a 
three-stage least squares estimation of the baseline model where the second column 
describes the effect of the transmission variables on growth and, the last column 
indicates the impact of corruption on each channel variable. 
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Table 2. Main empirical results 
 
 
As a first result, we found that the coefficients related to the five transmission 
channels included in the growth regression are all statistically significant at the 
conventional levels and, they enter with the expected sings. This finding is in line with 
previous empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth that have 
supported a positive effect of investment and human capital on growth and, on the 
other hand, a negative impact of inflation, government expenditures and political 
instability. In addition, ours results reveal that corruption is negatively associated 
with human capital, investment and government expenditures, and it is positively 
correlated with inflation and political instability. Particularly, we found that the 
coefficient on corruption is statistically significant at the 1% level in human capital, 
government expenditures and political instability equations. These results 
corroborated those obtained by various empirical studies dealing with the 
consequences of corruption. However, we found that the coefficient on corruption in 
investment and inflation equations is statistically insignificant, although having the 
expected sign. Somewhat surprisingly, this finding contrasts with previous empirical 
results that have shown a clear negative impact of corruption on investment and a 
positive effect of corruption on inflation. In this regard, it is important to note that 
most empirical previous studies analyzing the effect of corruption either on investment 
or on inflation are mainly based on a single equation model and, therefore, were not 
Channel variable Effect of channel on growth Effect of corruption on channel 
   
Human Capital 0.000588*** 
(4.343) 
-8.582*** 
(-3.115) 
   
Investment 0.00279*** 
(4.728) 
-1.134 
(-1.164) 
   
Government Expenditures -0.00142*** 
(-4.083) 
-3.321*** 
(-2.849) 
   
Inflation -0.00436** 
(-1.738) 
0.211 
(0.850) 
   
Political Instability -0.00855** 
(-2.138) 
0.545*** 
(6.001) 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics  
*** and **  denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1 and 10% level, respectively.  
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exploring the impact of corruption on each of these variables following a model that 
takes into account the various incidences of corruption as described by the theoretical 
and empirical literature. In this regard, one explanation of this unexpected result may 
be due to the joint estimation of the effects of corruption on several variables. This 
explanation is supported by Dreher and Herzfeld’s (2005) study which jointly 
estimates the effects of corruption on various determinants of economic growth and 
shows that the impact of corruption on investment is statistically insignificant and 
even positive8. In the light of these results, we propose in the following subsection to 
calculate the indirect impacts of corruption and to quantify the relative contribution of 
each transmission channel to its overall effect on growth.  
4.2. Identifying channels of influence  
We present in this subsection our results on the effects of corruption on economic 
growth through each transmission variable and we discuss the relative importance of 
each variable in explaining the linkage between corruption and growth. The table 
below repeats the coefficient of the channel variable in the growth equation (column 2) 
and the coefficient of corruption in each channel equations (column 3) and, presents 
in the last column the product of the two coefficients that is the effect of corruption on 
growth via each channel variable. According to the results presented in Table 3, 
corruption works negatively for growth through four out of five of the channels under 
study. Our results show that corruption is likely to lower economic growth through its 
negative impacts on human capital and investment and, through its positive effects on 
inflation and political instability. A one point increase in the corruption index 
decreases growth by 0.5% via the human capital channel, by 0.31% via the investment 
channel, by 0.09 via the inflation channel and, by 0.46% via the political instability 
channel. All together, these four transmission variables reduce growth rate by 1.36%. 
The relative contribution of each of these variables to the negative effect of corruption 
on growth is about 36.6%, 33.8%, 22.9% and 6.6%, respectively for human capital, 
                                                          
8
 To investigate whether the lack of statistically significant impact of corruption on investment and 
inflation is driven by the joint estimation of the effects of corruption on several variables, we performed 
additional econometric regressions on the system of equations initially estimated while dropping one 
channel equation at a time. Doing so, we found that the coefficient on corruption in the investment 
equation becomes statistically significant when the human capital equation is not included in the system 
while the effect of corruption on inflation becomes significant when the political instability equation is 
excluded from the estimated model. The regression results showing significant effects of corruption on 
investment (system without human capital equation) and inflation (system without political instability 
equation) are available from the author on request. 
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political instability, investment and inflation. The results suggest that only the human 
capital and political instability channels involve statistically significant effects at the 
conventional levels. Taken together, human capital and political instability describe 
almost 70% of the total negative impact of corruption on growth. However, the effects 
of corruption transmitted through investment and inflation are statistically 
insignificant. This is mainly due to the fact that these variables are not significantly 
affected by corruption. In addition to its adverse effects, the estimates suggest that 
corruption seems to generate a significant improvement in the growth rate of about 
0.47% through the government expenditures channel.  
Table 3. Summary of the Channel Effects 
 
The summation of the partial effects of all channels of influence reveals that the 
overall effect of corruption on growth is negative and significantly different from zero. A 
one point increase in the corruption index is associated with a 0.9% decrease in the 
annual growth rate once all transmission channels are taken into account. Although 
they are in accordance with past findings that provide evidence of a harmful impact of 
corruption on growth, the results of our estimates suggest that this negative effect is 
transmitted mainly through human capital and political instability channels while the 
relative contribution of investment channel seems to be smaller than that suggested 
Channel variable 
Effect of channel on 
growth 
Effect of corruption 
on channel 
Effect of corruption 
on growth     
Human Capital 0.000588*** 
(4.343) 
-8.582*** 
(-3.115) 
-0.0050494*** 
(-2.64) 
    
Investment  0.00279*** 
(4.728) 
-1.134 
(-1.164) 
-0.0031579 
(-1.13) 
    
Government Expenditures -0.00142*** 
(-4.083) 
-3.321*** 
(-2.849) 
0.0047313** 
(2.38) 
    
Inflation -0.00436* 
(-1.738) 
0.211 
(0.850) 
-0.0009189 
(-0.77) 
    
Political Instability -0.00855* 
(-2.138) 
0.545*** 
(6.001) 
-0.0046597** 
(-2.09) 
    
Overall Effect  
  -0.0090544** 
(-2.49) 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics  
***, ** and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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by the studies of Mo (2001), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) and Pellegrini (2011). 
Moreover, our findings contrast with these studies regarding the relative importance of 
the human capital channel in explaining the relationship between corruption and 
economic growth. Indeed, a common result to these three studies is that human 
capital does not appear to be an important transmission channel as it accounts only 
for 14.8, 5 and 13% of the total effect of corruption on economic growth, respectively 
in each of these studies. We also note that our results does not corroborate those 
obtained by Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) concerning the role of inflation in the 
transmission processes. While we found that inflation is one of the channels through 
which corruption adversely affects growth, these authors show that this variable 
involves a positive effect of corruption on economic growth. Finally, our results are in 
line with those of Mo (2001), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) and Pellegrini (2011) 
regarding the negative impact of corruption on economic growth via the political 
instability channel, and those of Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) who report that 
corruption might have positive growth effect by lowering government expenditures.  
5. Robustness checks  
In this section, we extend the analysis by testing the robustness of our results on 
the linkages between corruption and economic growth. Firstly, we consider another 
index of corruption and we use a different estimation method. Thus, we will check if 
our results depend on the corruption measure and the estimation technique we have 
chosen. Secondly, we examine the exhaustiveness of the estimated model by carrying 
out a test based on the residuals from the growth equation. Finally, we test the 
sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of trade openness as an additional channel 
through which corruption should affect growth. 
5. 1. Sensitivity to the measure of corruption and to the estimation method 
As a first robustness check, we use the Graft Index by Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2008) as an alternative measure of corruption to see whether the results 
are validated when we use different corruption data. We then examine the sensitivity 
of the results to the choice of a different econometric technique. To do so, we run the 
model using the seemingly unrelated regression estimator (SURE). This estimator, 
though inconsistent because it proceeds without instrumenting for the endogenous 
variables, may provide a greater efficiency by taking into account a possible correlation 
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between the disturbances of the different equations.  Tables 4 and 5 display the 
estimation results using the Graft index and the seemingly unrelated regression 
estimator (these estimates are reported in detail in appendix, table 6 and 7).  
Table. 4. Summary of the Channel Effects Using the Graft Index 
Table. 5. Summary of the Channel Effects Using SUR estimates 
Channel variable 
Effect of channel on 
growth 
Effect of corruption 
on channel 
Effect of corruption 
on growth     
Human Capital 0.000571*** 
(4.20) 
-14.00*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.0079853*** 
(-2.60) 
    
Investment 0.00268*** 
(4.59) 
-2.430** 
(-1.77) 
-0.0065136 
(-1.64) 
    
Government Expenditures -0.00139*** 
(-3.97) 
-5.767*** 
(-3.48) 
0.008004*** 
(2.66) 
    
Inflation -0.00406 
(-1.62) 
0.309 
(0.84) 
-0.0012547 
(-0.75) 
    
Political Instability -0.00789*** 
(-1.94) 
0.832*** 
(7.95) 
-0.0065678** 
(-1.94) 
    
Overall Effect 
  -0.0143175*** 
(-2.71)  
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics  
*** and ** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1 and 10% level, respectively. 
Channel variable 
Effect of channel on 
growth 
Effect of corruption 
on channel 
Effect of corruption 
on growth     
Human Capital 0.000489*** 
(5.82) 
-3.451* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0016872* 
(-1.86) 
    
Investment 0.00147*** 
(4.52) 
-0.193 
(-0.41) 
-0.0002826 
(-0.41) 
    
Government Expenditures -0.000913*** 
(-3.99) 
-1.631** 
(-2.44) 
0.0014886* 
(2.09) 
    
Inflation -0.00140 
(-1.38) 
0.0969 
(0.61) 
-0.000136 
(-0.55) 
    
Political Instability -0.00743*** 
(-3.52) 
0.447*** 
(7.31) 
-0.0033159*** 
(-3.21) 
    
Overall Effect 
  -0.003933*** 
(-2.60) 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics  
***, ** and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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As can be seen from the tables, the results are roughly unchanged in relation to 
those obtained in the previous section, especially regarding the negative effect of 
corruption on growth and the relative importance of each channel in explaining the 
relationship between these two variables. Indeed, we find again that human capital 
and political instability are the most important channels through which corruption is 
likely to reduce growth. We also find that government expenditures remain the only 
channel that involves a positive effect of corruption on economic growth. Table 4 
confirms that the results are not sensitive to the use of a different data on corruption. 
We can notice that all coefficients have the same sign and roughly the same 
magnitudes compared to the ones estimated using the ICRG corruption index. This is 
not unexpected given that the two measures of corruption we used are highly 
correlated (for our sample, the correlation between the two measures of corruption 
equals 0.847). Table 5 shows that the results on the channels remain essentially 
unchanged, but the magnitude of the effect of corruption on economic growth 
decreases substantially when using the seemingly unrelated regression estimator, 
highlighting the importance of instrumenting for the endogenous variables when 
exploring the links between corruption and growth.  
5. 2. Exhaustiveness of the Model9 
In order to see whether the five channels we have chosen fully capture the total 
effect of corruption on growth, we run a test based on the residuals from the growth 
equation. This test proceeds by regressing the residual vector obtained from the 
system estimates of the growth equation on the corruption index. A significant effect of 
corruption on the residuals could indicate that some transmission variables have been 
omitted from the growth equation, reflecting therefore that the five channels under 
study have not been able to provide an exhaustive overview on the linkage between 
corruption and economic growth. Table 6 below displays the results obtained from 
three-stage least squares and seemingly unrelated regressions estimations, using the 
two indexes of corruption.  
 
                                                          
9
 Tests performed in this subsection are suggested by Wacziarg (2001, p. 421-422).  However, we note that 
the test based on the residuals from the growth equation, as highlighted by Wacziarg (2001, p. 421), 
should not be considered as an absolute proof of exhaustiveness but as an indication that no relevant 
channel has been omitted.  
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Table 6. Test based on the residuals from the growth equation 
 ICRG Graft 
 3SLS SURE 3SLS SURE 
     
Corruption Index -0.00109 
(-0.85) 
-0.000859 
(-0.85) 
-0.000582 
(-0.39) 
-0.000802 
(-0.66) 
     
Intercept 0.00269 
(0.75) 
0.00212 
(0.75) 
0.00125 
(0.35) 
0.00172 
(0.53 
     
N 82 82 82 82 
R² 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.005 
 
The results show that the effect of corruption on the residuals is negative but never 
statistically significant, regardless of the estimation method and the measure of 
corruption. This finding seems to confirm that no significant channel variable has 
been omitted, suggesting that the five channels chosen to explore links between 
corruption and growth have been able to explain exhaustively the relationship between 
these two variables.  
Additional evidence of the model’s exhaustiveness can be provided by comparing 
the overall effect of corruption on growth computed in the previous section with its 
unconditional effect obtained by removing all of the channel variables from the growth 
equation and using only the corruption index. Table 7 summarizes the unconditional 
effect of corruption on economic growth obtained from three-stage least squares and 
seemingly unrelated regressions estimates (these estimates are reported in appendix in 
tables 8 and 9). 
Table 7. Unconditional effect of corruption on economic growth 
 3SLS SURE 
   
Corruption Index (ICRG) -0.00863*** 
(-3.31) 
-0.00598*** 
(-3.20) 
   
N 82 82 
   
R² 0.085 0.129 
   
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics  
*** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
We note that the resulting estimates are consistent with those obtained in the 
previous section. On the one hand, we find again a negative and significant effect of 
corruption on economic growth and, on the other hand, the magnitude of the effect is 
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almost the same when compared to the one computed earlier (the magnitude of the 
overall effect initially computed equals 0.009).   
5. 3. Sensitivity to the inclusion of an additional channel  
As some previous researchers have noted, there may be additional indirect effects of 
corruption on growth. To address this issue, we propose to extend the analysis by 
including trade openness as a possible channel through which corruption should 
affect growth. According to Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) and Pellegrini (2011), this 
channel seems to explain a considerable part of the effect of corruption on growth. In 
this respect, we consider an additional equation to take into account the effect of 
corruption on trade openness. To do so, we adopt a specification close to that 
estimated by Wacziarg (2001) which contains the usual determinants of trade 
openness10. Table 8 reports the regression results of adding the trade openness 
equation to the baseline model, using a three-stage least squares estimator (these 
estimates are displayed in detail in appendix, table 10). The resulting estimates 
suggest some observations. Firstly, the trade openness channel seems to work 
positively to economic growth, which contrasts with the findings of Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2004) and Pellegrini (2011). We note however that this is not due to the 
absence of a negative effect of corruption on trade openness, but rather because this 
variable seems to exert a negative impact on economic growth11. Secondly, some 
channel effects seems to be quite sensitive to the inclusion of trade openness as an 
additional channel. In particular, the government expenditures effect is much reduced 
and becomes statistically insignificant whereas the investment effect becomes positive, 
which cast considerable doubt on the robustness of this channel. Thirdly, the 
inclusion of the trade openness channel does not seem to affect the estimates of the 
most important channels, namely human capital and political instability. These two 
variables remain the only channels describing a negative and significant effect of 
                                                          
10
 In addition to the corruption index, the specification of trade openness equation includes the initial 
level of per capita GPD (IGDP), two measures for the country size (country population, POP and country 
land area, AREA), the government size measured by government consumption as a share of GDP (GOV), a 
landlocked country dummy (LANDLOCK), an island dummy (ISLAND), an oil exporter dummy (OIL) and a 
post-war independence dummy (POSTWAR).  
11
 Despite an extensive literature on the benefits of trade openness, some researchers explicitly recognize 
that the positive association between trade openness and growth seems to be difficult to highlight (see, for 
instance, Rodrik and Rodriguez, 2000 and Wacziarg, 2001). 
  
 25 
corruption on growth, highlighting once again their robustness in explaining the links 
between corruption and growth. 
Table 8. Summary of the Channel Effects Including the Trade Openness channel  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
A wide literature has focused on the consequences of corruption. Several writers 
have argued that corruption has negative effects on economic performance for a 
variety of reasons. As yet, however, the existing empirical literature seems to be 
unable to sort out whether corruption is beneficial or harmful to growth in a cross-
country setting. To better understand the effect of corruption, it is important to specify 
the mechanisms via which it should affect growth. In this respect, some researchers 
have shown that there are important indirect effects of corruption on growth that are 
manifested through the main sources of income growth. This paper has investigated 
how corruption affects economic growth through a variety of channels for a cross-
section of 82 countries for the period 1980-2002. Unlike most previous studies that 
adopted the decomposition method developed by Mo (2001), the econometric 
methodology followed in this paper is close to the one used by Tavares and Wacziarg 
Channel variable 
Effect of channel on 
growth 
Effect of corruption 
on channel 
Effect of corruption 
on growth 
    
Human Capital 0.000554*** 
(4.24) 
-10.98*** 
(-3.94) 
-0.0060794*** 
(-3.02) 
    
Investment 0.00353*** 
(6.49) 
0.370 
(0.46) 
0.001308 
(0.46) 
    
Government Expenditures -0.000673* 
(-1.74) 
-2.792** 
(-2.43) 
0.0018796 
(1.42) 
    
Inflation -0.00602*** 
(-3.24) 
0.109 
(0.47) 
-0.0006539 
(-0.47) 
    
Political Instability -0.0100** 
(-2.53) 
0.552*** 
(3.33) 
-0.0055491** 
(-2.48) 
Openness -0.000130** 
(-2.32) 
-5.455 
(-0.72) 
0.0007116 
(0.69) 
    
Overall Effect 
  -0.0083831** 
(-2.29)  
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics  
***, ** and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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(2001). This methodology is based on a system of simultaneous equations which 
accounts for the impacts of corruption on several determinants of growth: investment, 
human capital, political instability, inflation and, government expenditures. Our 
results suggest that human capital and political instability are the most important 
transmission variables through which corruption is likely to reduce growth. However, 
there is no evidence that investment constitutes a significant transmission channel via 
which corruption operates. In addition, we find that the sole beneficial effect of 
corruption is by lowering government expenditures. Summing up all channel effects, 
corruption is found to be negatively associated with economic growth.  These findings 
have been shown to be robust to a series of tests (different estimation technique, 
alternative measure of corruption, model’s exhaustiveness). In line with several other 
studies, the empirical results in this paper confirm the detrimental effect of 
corruption. Nevertheless, further research remains crucial to improving our 
understanding of the interaction between corruption and economic growth. It may be 
interesting to increase the size of the sample and to show how corruption would affect 
growth across countries with different institutional frameworks or at different stages of 
economic development. In addition, future extensions should analyze carefully the 
impact of corruption on the usual determinants of economic growth. Finally, to the 
extent that we found human capital to be the most important channel through which 
corruption reduces growth, the conclusions we made need to be followed by detailed 
country analysis or case studies. In this respect, microeconomic evaluations of the 
costs of corruption within the education sector appear to be important areas for future 
empirical research.   
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Appendix 
Table 1. List of countries  
 
 
 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bahrein 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Iceland 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Republic of 
Kuwait 
Luxembourg 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Malta 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Norway 
Oman 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Saudi Arabia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Suriname 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syria 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
  
 33 
Table 2. Variables Description and Sources of Data 
 
 
 
Variable Description and data source 
growth Growth rate of Real Gross Domestic Product per capita for the period 1980-
2002. Source: WDI (2004). 
ICRG Corruption index (rescaled: 6-original values), 1982-2001 averages. Source: 
ICRG, International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk Services, USA. 
Graft Corruption index (rescaled: 2.5 - original values), 1996- 2002 averages. 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
INV Investment: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP), 1980-2002 averages.  
Source: WDI (2004).  
HC Human Capital:  School Enrollment, Secondary (% Gross), 1980-2002 
averages.  Source: WDI (2004). 
GOV Government Expenditures: General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP), 1980-2002 averages.  Source: WDI (2004). 
INFL Inflation: Logarithm of GDP Deflator (Annual %), 1980-2002 averages.  
Source: WDI (2004). 
PI Political Instability Index (rescaled: 2.5 - original values), 1996- 2002 
averages. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008).  
IGDP Logarithm of real per capita GDP in 1980.  Source: WDI (2004). 
GDP Logarithm of real per capita GDP (Constant 1995 US$), 1980-2002 averages.  
Source: WDI (2004). 
PSE Public Spending on Education, Total (% of GDP), 1980-2002 averages.  
Source: WDI (2004).  
URBAN Urban population (% of Total), 1980-2002 averages.  Source: WDI (2004).  
POP Total population: logarithm of total population, 1980-2002 averages. Source: 
WDI (2004). 
POP15 Population ages 0-14 (% of total), 1980-2002 averages.  Source: WDI (2004). 
POP65 Population ages 65 and above (% of total), 1980-2002 averages.  Source: WDI 
(2004). 
OPEN Trade Openness: Share of imports plus exports to GDP (Constant price 
entries), 1980-2002 averages. Source: Heston et al. (2006). 
ELF Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization: Probability that two randomly selected 
persons from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic 
group (1985 values). Source: Roeder, P.G (2001). 
PROT Protestant religion:  The percentage of the population belonging to the 
Protestant religion in 1980.  Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
AREA Land area: Logarithm of area in square kilometers. Source: WDI (2004). 
COLUK Dummy variable = 1 if the country is United Kingdom or has been a colony of 
United Kingdom, 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman, D. (2000). 
LANDLOCK Dummy variable = 1 if the country is landlocked, 0 otherwise. Source : GDNGD 
(2009)  
DLP Dummy variable = 1 if the country experienced uninterrupted democracy 
from 1950 to 1995, 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman, D. (2000). 
OIL Dummy variable = 1 if the country is oil producer, 0 otherwise. Source: Sala-
i-Martin, Doppelhoffer and Miller (2004). 
POSTWAR Dummy variable = 1 if the country gained independence after the Second 
World War, 0 otherwise. Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2011), The World 
Factbook. 
ISLAND Dummy variable = 1 if the country is an island, 0 otherwise. Source : Rose A. 
(2006)  
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Table 4. System estimates (2SLS, ICRG Corruption Index) 
 growth Human Capital     Investment Government Expenditures   Inflation Political Instability Corruption 
  HC INV GOV INFL PI ICRG 
        
HC 0.000445***  0.0563     
 (2.90)  (1.00)     
INV 0.00243***       
 (3.65)       
GOV -0.00108***  -0.0193  0.0142 0.0295  
 (-2.89)  (-0.10)  (0.35) (1.61)  
INFL -0.00175       
 (-0.60)       
PI -0.0104**      0.217 
 (-2.35)      (0.89) 
ICRG  -6.219** -0.148 -3.143** 0.102 0.437***  
  (-2.10) (-0.13) (-2.38) (0.39) (4.46)  
IGDP -0.00939***  -1.302* 2.111*  -0.120  
 (-3.26)  (-1.79) (1.87)  (-1.56)  
GDP  9.944***   -0.288  -0.243*** 
  (3.34)   (-1.55)  (-2.76) 
PSE  1.947*      
  (1.72)      
URBAN  0.275**  0.00478    
  (2.06)  (0.10)    
ELF  -8.092 -5.817*** -0.413 -0.0757 0.351  
  (-1.20) (-3.42) (-0.17) (-0.13) (1.41)  
OPEN   0.0279**  -0.0103***   
   (2.26)  (-2.76)   
POP15   -0.339 0.448**    
   (-1.61) (2.32)    
POP65   -0.733*** 0.0318    
   (-2.68) (0.08)    
POP    -1.264***  0.172***  
    (-3.41)  (3.57)  
LANDLOCK      -0.196  
      (-1.08)  
DLP       -1.249*** 
       (-4.40) 
PROT       -0.00927*** 
       (-2.66) 
COLUK       0.114 
       (0.72) 
Intercept 0.0507 -19.35 45.44*** 12.53 5.005** -1.115 4.332*** 
 (1.63) (-0.69) (3.66) (0.72) (2.20) (-0.88) (3.54) 
R²                0.394                0.824                0.413                                        0.382                0.237                 0.613                 0.748 
Number of countries: 82. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. System estimates (3SLS, ICRG Corruption Index) 
 growth Human Capital      Investment Government Expenditures      Inflation Political Instability Corruption 
   HC INV GOV INFL PI ICRG 
        
HC 0.000588***  0.0897*     
 (4.34)  (1.77)     
INV 0.00279***       
 (4.73)       
GOV -0.00142***  -0.212  0.0193 0.0487***  
 (-4.08)  (-1.29)  (0.51) (3.06)  
INFL -0.00436*       
 (-1.74)       
PI -0.00855**      0.238 
 (-2.14)      (1.06) 
ICRG  -8.582*** -1.134 -3.321*** 0.211 0.545***  
  (-3.11) (-1.16) (-2.85) (0.85) (6.00)  
IGDP -0.0121***  -1.257* 2.342**  -0.101  
 (-4.64)  (-1.89) (2.34)  (-1.42)  
GDP  10.22***   -0.235  -0.238*** 
  (3.72)   (-1.32)  (-2.87) 
PSE  0.755      
  (0.74)      
URBAN  0.218*  0.00853    
  (1.81)  (0.20)    
ELF  -5.841 -6.263*** 0.0823 -0.142 0.235  
  (-0.96) (-4.06) (0.04) (-0.25) (1.07)  
OPEN   0.0331***  -0.00884**   
   (3.05)  (-2.58)   
POP15   -0.165 0.506***    
   (-0.90) (3.08)    
POP65   -0.737*** 0.0428    
   (-3.05) (0.12)    
POP    -1.402***  0.195***  
    (-4.27)  (4.64)  
LANDLOCK      -0.259*  
      (-1.77)  
DLP       -1.212*** 
       (-4.72) 
PROT       -0.00887*** 
       (-2.88) 
COLUK       -0.0414 
       (-0.30) 
Intercept 0.0626** -8.146 42.55*** 10.86 4.146* -2.156* 4.275*** 
 (2.22) (-0.31) (3.84) (0.72) (1.90) (-1.89) (3.77) 
R² 0.182 0.807 0.345 0.367 0.219 0.542 0.746 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(21) = 30.936, Pr = 0.0747, Hausman Test: (2SLS versus 3SLS) : chi2(38) = 3.57, Prob>chi2 = 1.0000  
Number of countries: 82. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Sensitivity to the measure of corruption: System estimates using the Graft Index (3SLS estimator) 
 growth Human Capital   Investment Government Expenditures   Inflation Political Instability Corruption 
  HC INV GOV INFL PI Graft 
        
HC 0.000571***  0.0743     
 (4.20)  (1.43)     
INV 0.00268***       
 (4.59)       
GOV -0.00139***  -0.266  0.0189 0.0303**  
 (-3.97)  (-1.59)  (0.51) (2.41)  
INFL -0.00406       
 (-1.62)       
PI -0.00789*      0.482*** 
 (-1.94)      (4.30) 
ICRG  -14.00*** -2.430* -5.767*** 0.309 0.832***  
  (-3.10) (-1.77) (-3.48) (0.84) (7.95)  
IGDP -0.0113***  -1.258* 1.524  0.0894  
 (-4.32)  (-1.78) (1.39)  (1.30)  
GDP  7.108**   -0.173  -0.288*** 
  (2.00)   (-0.75)  (-7.02) 
PSE  0.627      
  (0.60)      
URBAN  0.233*  0.0116    
  (1.89)  (0.27)    
ELF  -5.242 -5.777*** 0.434 -0.0527 0.130  
  (-0.88) (-3.91) (0.21) (-0.10) (0.77)  
OPEN   0.0295***  -0.00941***   
   (2.96)  (-2.96)   
POP15   -0.0661 0.615***    
   (-0.33) (3.81)    
POP65   -0.628*** 0.0575    
   (-2.74) (0.19)    
POP    -1.161***  0.117***  
    (-3.45)  (3.52)  
LANDLOCK      -0.127  
      (-1.07)  
DLP       -0.542*** 
       (-4.28) 
PROT       -0.00334** 
       (-2.19) 
COLUK       -0.140** 
       (-2.02) 
Intercept 0.0573** 25.33 42.89*** 13.65 3.510 -2.540*** 3.555*** 
 (2.01) (0.71) (3.78) (0.98) (1.25) (-2.60) (6.29) 
R² 0.235 0.826 0.276 0.437 0.272 0.764 0.912 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(21) =   39.587, Pr = 0.0083, Hausman Test: (2SLS versus 3SLS) : chi2(38) = 23.80, Prob>chi2 = 0.9651 
Number of countries: 82. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Sensitivity to the estimation method: SUR estimates (ICRG Corruption Index) 
 growth Human Capital    Investment  Government Expenditures    Inflation Political Instability Corruption 
 g HC INV GOV INFL PI ICRG 
        
HC 0.000489***  0.0360     
 (5.82)  (1.34)     
INV 0.00147***       
 (4.52)       
GOV -0.000913***  -0.0270  0.0197 0.0154  
 (-3.99)  (-0.34)  (0.76) (1.44)  
INFL -0.00140       
 (-1.38)       
PI -0.00743***      0.619*** 
 (-3.52)      (5.23) 
ICRG  -3.451* -0.193 -1.631** 0.0969 0.447***  
  (-1.94) (-0.41) (-2.44) (0.61) (7.31)  
IGDP -0.00883***  -1.235** 3.294***  -0.100*  
 (-4.81)  (-2.16) (3.64)  (-1.75)  
GDP  13.50***   -0.303**  -0.141** 
  (6.04)   (-2.13)  (-2.09) 
PSE  1.597      
  (1.63)      
URBAN  0.151  0.00139    
  (1.29)  (0.03)    
ELF  -6.880 -6.256*** 0.841 -0.169 0.292  
  (-1.13) (-4.28) (0.39) (-0.30) (1.35)  
OPEN   0.0303***  -0.00933***   
   (3.48)  (-3.01)   
POP15   -0.393*** 0.598***    
   (-2.89) (3.55)    
POP65   -0.754*** 0.357    
   (-3.46) (1.14)    
POP    -1.430***  0.142***  
    (-4.40)  (3.86)  
LANDLOCK      -0.230  
      (-1.54)  
DLP       -1.050*** 
       (-4.38) 
PROT       -0.00733** 
       (-2.37) 
COLUK       0.0751 
       (0.52) 
Intercept 0.0529*** -46.72** 48.51*** -5.667 5.018*** -0.543 2.476*** 
 (3.31) (-2.47) (5.28) (-0.42) (3.17) (-0.61) (3.45) 
R² 0.491 0.829 0.414 0.426 0.236 0.621 0.734 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(21) = 30.936, Pr = 0.0747 
Number of countries: 82. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Unconditional effect of corruption on economic growth (3SLS estimates, ICRG Corruption Index) 
 growth Human Capital   Investment Government Expenditures      Inflation Political Instability Corruption 
  HC INV GOV INFL PI ICRG 
        
ICRG -0.00863*** -8.079*** 0.258 -4.246*** 0.146 0.505***  
 (-3.31) (-2.92) (0.26) (-3.58) (0.59) (5.53)  
IGDP -0.00242  -0.784 1.750*  -0.115  
 (-1.24)  (-1.20) (1.74)  (-1.61)  
GDP  9.599***   -0.264  -0.237*** 
  (3.54)   (-1.48)  (-2.88) 
PSE  1.348      
  (1.35)      
URBAN  0.249**  0.0332    
  (2.10)  (0.79)    
ELF  -2.411 -4.844*** -0.378 -0.288 0.123  
  (-0.39) (-3.16) (-0.17) (-0.51) (0.56)  
GOV   0.0183  0.00912 0.0421***  
   (0.11)  (0.24) (2.67)  
HC   0.0337     
   (0.67)     
OPEN   0.0260**  -0.00873**   
   (2.40)  (-2.55)   
POP15   -0.338* 0.552***    
   (-1.82) (3.31)    
POP65   -0.648*** -0.0120    
   (-2.68) (-0.03)    
POP    -1.263***  0.194***  
    (-3.81)  (4.63)  
        
LANDLOCK      -0.210  
      (-1.41)  
PI       0.358 
       (1.62) 
DLP       -1.117*** 
       (-4.41) 
PROT       -0.00681** 
       (-2.24) 
COLUK       -0.0336 
       (-0.24) 
Intercept 0.0500** -10.34 40.25*** 13.25 4.772** -1.773 3.921*** 
 (2.35) (-0.40) (3.63) (0.87) (2.19) (-1.56) (3.49) 
R² 0.085 0.811 0.399 0.294 0.228 0.569 0.746 
Number of countries: 82. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9. Unconditional effect of corruption on economic growth (SUR estimates, ICRG Corruption Index) 
 growth Human Capital   Investment Government Expenditures     Inflation Political Instability Corruption 
 g HC INV GOV INFL PI ICRG 
        
ICRG -0.00598*** -3.791** -0.107 -1.718** 0.0847 0.442***  
 (-3.20) (-2.11) (-0.23) (-2.56) (0.53) (7.23)  
IGDP -0.000740  -0.860 3.050***  -0.108*  
 (-0.46)  (-1.54) (3.36)  (-1.88)  
GDP  12.50***   -0.314**  -0.152** 
  (5.64)   (-2.21)  (-2.25) 
PSE  1.978**      
  (2.06)      
URBAN  0.205*  0.00836    
  (1.78)  (0.19)    
ELF  -1.498 -4.971*** 0.722 -0.333 0.125  
  (-0.25) (-3.51) (0.34) (-0.59) (0.59)  
GOV   -0.0118  0.0148 0.0127  
   (-0.16)  (0.57) (1.22)  
HC   0.0366     
   (1.41)     
OPEN   0.0275***  -0.00895***   
   (3.27)  (-2.90)   
POP15   -0.320** 0.586***    
   (-2.45) (3.46)    
POP65   -0.680*** 0.356    
   (-3.24) (1.13)    
POP    -1.395***  0.144***  
    (-4.28)  (3.97)  
LANDLOCK      -0.216  
      (-1.47)  
PI       0.608*** 
       (5.16) 
DLP       -1.074*** 
       (-4.49) 
PROT       -0.00659** 
       (-2.13) 
COLUK       0.0752 
       (0.52) 
Intercept 0.0299* -45.07** 41.67*** -3.998 5.271*** -0.386 2.584*** 
 (1.82) (-2.38) (4.68) (-0.29) (3.33) (-0.44) (3.61) 
R² 0.129 0.829 0.410 0.427 0.235 0.617 0.735 
Number of countries: 82. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10. Sensitivity to the inclusion of an additional channel, Trade Openness (3SLS estimates, ICRG Corruption Index) 
 growth Human Capital    Investment  Government Expenditures Inflation Political Instability Openness Corruption 
  HC INV GOV INFL PI OPEN ICRG 
         
HC 0.000554***  0.0311      
 (4.24)  (0.64)      
INV 0.00353***        
 (6.49)        
GOV -0.000673*  0.105  0.0269 0.0451*** 1.398  
 (-1.74)  (0.72)  (0.73) (3.22) (0.95)  
INFL -0.00602***        
 (-3.24)        
PI -0.0100**       0.392* 
 (-2.53)       (1.90) 
OPEN -0.000130**  0.0198  -0.0117***    
 (-2.32)  (1.29)  (-2.64)    
ICRG  -10.98*** 0.370 -2.792** 0.109 0.552*** -5.455  
  (-3.94) (0.46) (-2.43) (0.47) (6.33) (-0.72)  
IGDP -0.0140***  -1.129* 2.809***  -0.0917 -4.864  
 (-5.25)  (-1.66) (2.82)  (-1.31) (-0.91)  
GDP  7.553***   -0.330*   -0.213*** 
  (2.78)   (-1.89)   (-2.67) 
PSE  0.133       
  (0.13)       
URBAN  0.320***  -0.00496     
  (2.71)  (-0.12)     
ELF  -7.944 -5.941*** 0.0452 -0.379 0.196   
  (-1.32) (-3.99) (0.02) (-0.67) (0.95)   
POP15   -0.363* 0.545***     
   (-1.87) (3.28)     
POP65   -0.616** 0.141     
   (-2.31) (0.40)     
POP    -1.325***  0.185*** -9.838**  
     (-4.07)  (4.59) (-2.37)  
LANDLOCK      -0.224 0.206  
      (-1.57) (0.02)  
AREA       -8.691***  
       (-3.27)  
ISLAND       -9.764  
       (-0.78)  
POSTWAR       9.038  
       (0.77)  
OIL       21.61  
    
 
   (1.59)  
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 growth Human Capital    Investment  Government Expenditures Inflation Political Instability Openness Corruption 
         
DLP        -1.097*** 
        (-4.49) 
PROT        -0.00730** 
        (-2.48) 
COLUK        -0.0515 
        (-0.39) 
Intercept 0.0692** 17.10 43.03*** 3.423 5.354*** -2.019* 359.8*** 3.657*** 
 (2.47) (0.65) (3.32) (0.23) (2.60) (-1.88) (4.32) (3.43) 
R² 0.085 0.786 0.390 0.396 0.231 0.547 0.485 0.745 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(21) = 41.012, Pr =  0.0536, Hausman Test : (2SLS versus 3SLS) : chi2(46) = 22.99, Prob>chi2 = 0.9982  
Number of countries: 82. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
